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Summary findings
Significant changes in public investment patterns-in  As the smallest, poorest municipalities invested newly
both the sectoral uses of funds and their geographic  devolved public funds in their highest priority projects,
distribution-emerged  after Bolivia devolved substantial  investment showed a strong, positive relationship with
resources from central agencies to municipalities in  need in agriculture and the social sectors. In sectors
1994. By far the most important  determinant of these  where decentralization did not bring about changes, the
changes are objective indicators of social need (for  central government had invested little before 1994 and
example, education investment rises where illiteracy is  the local government continued to invest little afterward.
higher). Indicators of institutional capacity and social  These findings are consistent with a model of public
organization are less important.  investment in which local government's superior
Empirical tests using a unique database show that  knowledge of local needs dominates the central
investment changed significantly in education,  government's technical and organizational advantage in
agriculture, urban development, water management,  the provision of public services.
water and sanitation, and possibly health. These results
are robust and insensitive to specification.
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The wisdom of decentralizing  government  has become popular  currency  in our time. At the
end of a century  that witnessed  the sustained  growth  of the central  state in both the
developed  and developing  worlds,  reformers  and idealists  have turned  to decentralization  as
an antidote  to ills as varied as governmental  corruption,  autocracy  and repression,  and
public-sector  inefficiency. But the public discussion  of decentralization  is often confusing,
assuming  the character  of sweeping,  cross-disciplinary  claims about the effects  of
administrative  measures  on the quality and efficiency  of both government  and social
interaction. Competing  proposals,  expressed  in a lexicon  that spans economics,  political
science, sociology  and public administration  are often hard to compare either as policy
instruments  or in terms of the effects  they are designed  to produce. Unfortunately,  much of
the empirical  literature on decentralization  is similarly  messy and inconclusive,
simultaneously  examining  issues  as diverse  and ill-defined  as access  to resources,
participation,  administrative  capacity,  employment,  growth, and local and national
development  strategies. Having cast such a wide net, such studies subsequently  fail to
ground their research theoretically,  and their empirical  approach  often descends into
description  and anecdote  from selected  cases of decentralization  in very different countries.
The radical  and well-documented  experience  of Bolivia offers  us the opportunity  of
conducting a methodologically  rigorous study of decentralization,  where we focus on a few
questions which are among  the most contentious  in the field  but have not been answered
adequately  in the literature. Restricting  our scope to decentralization  in one country  allows
us to control for external  shocks,  political  regime, institutional  and cultural  effects, and other
exogenous  factors  in a more systematic  way than cross-country  studies can. Furthermore,
the Bolivian reform coincided  with a huge upsurge  in the generation  of local-level  and
national data. These data are of surprising  scope and quality (especially  compared  to
Bolivia's national-income  cohort)  and include  not only the usual infornation on fiscal flows
and investment  sums, but also numnerous  variables  covering  political,  institutional,
administrative  and even  procedural  (good-government  type) indicators  for all of Bolivia's
31  1 municipalities. Our use of such variables  constitutes  an innovation  of this paper.
The central  question  that we seek to answer is does decentralization  increase  the
sensitivity  of public investment  decisions  to local needs. Secondary  questions  include:  (i)
Under what conditions  do the various effects  we posit (local knowledge,  central
government's technical and organizational  advantages,  political weight)  dominate?  and (ii)
What are the welfare implications  of different  levels  of public goods  provision under a
variety of assumptions? In addition,  this paper seeks to make a case by example  of how to
approach  such questions empirically. We argue that locally specific  economic  and political
decisions  by local government  and local civil society  are important,  and even defining,
Icharacteristics  of decentralization  which must be studied  if the phenomenon  is to be
properly understood.
Before  continuing,  it is important  to discuss  precisely  what we mean by
"decentralization,"  a word used in the policy literature  to refer  to everything  from the
administrative  deconcentration  of executive  agencies in autocratic  regimes  to privatization
in democracies. For the sake of focus, this paper will concentrate  on decentralization  under
democratic  regimes. We shall see that the presence and nature of democratic  controls  play a
large role in our ability to theorize  about  decentralization.  We define decentralization  as
follows:
Decentralization  is the devolution  by central  (i.e.,  national)  government  of
specific functions,  with all of the administrative,  political and economic
attributes  that these entail,  to local (i.e., municipal)  governments  which are
independent  of the center  within a legally  delimited  geographic  and
functional  domain.
The two reasons for choosing  this usage are both powerful and fortuitous. First, the
clarity  of the proposition  greatly  sirnplifies  analysis,  allowing  it to focus on discrete, well-
defined decentralizing  measures  and exogenous  variables  in order to gauge  the empirical
effects of each on policy outputs. Second,  the case of Bolivia  involves  precisely this form of
decentralization  (see section  2.1 below), implemented  uniquely  and vigorously.
The remainder  of the paper is organized  as follows. Section  2 discusses  Bolivia's
decentralization  program,  and then examine  in detail  the changes  in national resource  flows
which it brought about. Section  3 reviews the literature and then develops  a model to
analyze  the tradeoff  between local government's  knowledge  of local needs v. central
government's technical and organizational  advantage  in the provision of public services  in
districts  with heterogeneous  preferences. We use a simple  model of decentralization  defined
by two equations  to examine  the welfare  implications  of central  v. local goods  provision
under different  assumptions.  Section  4 discusses  our empirical  methodology  and then
presents three sets of econometric  results:  two tests of whether  decentralization  changed
public investment  patterns across  Bolivia's 311 municipalities,  and a set of sectoral  models
of this change  centered  on objective  variables  of need. Conclusions  and suggestions  for
further  research along this path are in section  5.
2.  Decentralization in Bolivia
2.1 Popular Participation and the Decentralization  Reform
On the eve of the 1952  revolution,  Bolivia was a poor, backward country  with
extreme  levels of inequality,  presided  over by a "typical  racist state in which the non-
Spanish speaking  indigenous  peasantry  was controlled  by a small, Spanish  speaking  white
2elite, [their power]  based ultimately  on violence  more than consensus  or any social pact."'
The nationalist  revolution  which followed  expropriated  the "commanding  heights"  of the
economy, and laid the foundations  for the development  of one of the most centralized  state
apparati  in the region. The ruling Nationalist  Revolutionary  Movement  embarked upon a
state-led  modernization  strategy  in which governing  elites in La Paz directed  a concerted
drive to erase  the social relations  of the past and create a new, more egalitarian  society. 2
Political  power was concentrated  in the hands  of the president,  who directly  appointed
departmental  governors  and heads of the regional  development  corporations,  among  many
others, and the legal and political instruments  of local governance  were by and large given
little chance to develop. As a result,  beyond the nine regional capitals  (including  La Paz)
and an additional  25-30 cities, local government  existed  in Bolivia at best in name, as an
honorary and ceremonial  institution  devoid  of administrative  capability  and starved  for
funds. And in most of the country  it did not exist at all (see point 4 below). This, very
generally,  is the background  against  which the Bolivian decentralization  reform was
announced  in 1994. The genesis of the reform,  along with the origins of the decentralization
idea in Bolivia and the interest groups  ranged  for and against it, are treated  in much detail in
Faguet (2000b). The scale of the change in resource  flows and political power that this law
brought about make it a fascinating  social  experiment  in decentralization,  worthy of study.
The core of the decentralization  reform consists  of four points: 3
1.  The share of all national  tax revenues  devolved from central government  to the
municipalities  was raised from 10  percent to 20 percent. More importantly,  whereas
before  these funds  were apportioned  according  to ad hoc, highly political  criteria,
after decentralization  they are allocated  strictly on a per capita  basis (see below).
2.  Title to all local infrastructure  related  to health, education,  culture, sports,  local roads
and irrigation  was transferred  to municipalities  free of charge, along  with the
responsibility  to administer,  maintain and stock  this with the necessary  supplies,
materials and equipment,  as well as invest in new infrastructure.
3.  Oversight Committees  (Comites  de Vigilancia)  were established  to oversee
municipal spending  of Popular  Participation  funds,  and propose new projects. These
are composed  of representatives  from local, grass-root  groups  within each
municipality,  and are legally  distinct from  municipal govermments.  Their power lies
in the ability  to suspend  all disbursements  from the central  government  to their
respective  municipal  governments  if they  judge that such funds are being misused  or
stolen, as well as the natural  moral authority  which they command. When
suspension  occurs, the center undertakes  no arbitration,  but simply  waits for the two
' Klein, H., p.237. Author's translation. Klein is one of the classical authorities on Bolivian history.
2 Klein, H., pp.236-240.
3 Ley de Participaci6n Popular, Reglamento de las Organizaciones Territoriales  de Base, Secretaria
Nacional de Participaci6n Popular,  Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Medio Amnbiente,  1994.
3sides to resolve  their dispute,  relying  on economic  incentives  to speed their
agreement. Oversight  Committees  thus comprise  a lean (their officials are unpaid),
corporatist  fonm  of social  representation  which is parallel to elected  municipal
legislatures  and serves somewhat  like an upper house of parliament,  as a check on
the power of mayors and municipal  councils. 4
4.  One-hundred  ninety-eight  new municipalities  - 64 percent of the total - were
created,  and existing  ones were expanded  to include suburbs and surrounding  rural
areas,  to the point where the 311 municipalities  exhaustively  comprise  the entire
national  territory.
The law heralded a new era  of municipal  government  for the overwhelming  majority
of Bolivian towns and cities. In many parts of Bolivia where before  the state was present, if
at all, in the form of a local schoolhouse,  health post and, perhaps, a military garrison or
customs office, each reporting  to its respective  ministry,  there was now for the first time
elected local government  accountable  only to local voters.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
The extent of the change is perhaps  best appreciated  by examining  the changes  in
resource  flows that it catalyzed. Decentralization  multiplied  municipalities' share of public
investment  17 times, from 0.7 to 12 percent of the total, and significantly  altered  its
distribution. Consider figure 1, showing  revenue-sharing  between  central and local
governments  for 1993,  the last year  prior to decentralization,  and 1995,  the first full year it
was in effect, for the capital and second city of each of the country's nine departments.
Total resources  devolved  from central  to local governments  increased  by 72 percent.
Though this is certainly  significant,  much more impressive  is the change  in the distribution
of these funds. Before decentralization  the nine departmental  capitals  shared 93 percent of
all funds devolved  from the center, leaving 7 percent for Bolivia's other 302 municipalities;
the three leading cities, La Paz, Cochabamba  and Santa Cruz, alone accounted  for 86
percent of the total. After decentralization  their shares fall to 38 percent and 27 percent
respectively. The per capita  criterion  results in a massive  shift of resources  in favor of the
smaller, poorer municipalities  in Bolivia. Starting  from a tiny or nonexistent  base, these
districts see enormous  increases  in their transfers,  collectively  exceeding 15,000  percent in
Oruro, 43,000 percent in Chuquisaca,  and 63,000  percent in distant  Pando. The larger cities
listed see more modest  gains,  5 and only La Paz suffers a net reduction in transfers,  itself a
sign of how disproportionately  it benefited  under the old system. Within-department
breakdowns similarly  show movement  from extreme  skewing  of resources  in favor of the
capitals  to a more equitable  distribution.
4I  am indebted  to Dr. Teddy  Brett  for  this insight.
This is possible only because of the large increase in total devolved funds.
4Figure  1. Decentralization  and  the Regional  Distribution  of Public  Funds
Central-to-Local  % of Departmental
Revenue Sharing (Bs'000)  Total
City  1993  1995  % Change  1993  1995
La Paz  114,292  61,976  -46%  95%  34%
El Alto  5,362  46,326  764%  4%  25%
ROD  1,120  76,170  6704%  1%  41%
total  120,774  184,472  53%
Santa Cruz(*)  51,278  63,076  23%  95%  51%
Montero  1,106  5,306  380%  2%  4%
ROD  1,774  56,012  3058%  3%  45%
total  54,157  124,394  130%
Cochabamba(*)  25,856  38,442  49%  88%  34%
Quillacoto  1,315  2,471  88%  4%  2%
ROD  2,108  73,688  3396%  7%  64%
total  29,279  114,601  291%
Oruro  6,969  15,925  129%  99%  56%
Challapata  29  1,090  3687%  0%  4%
ROD  74  11,198  15022%  1%  40%
total  7,072  28,213  299%
Potosi  1,208  13,990  1058%  66%  24%
Villazon  233  3,543  1420%  13%  6%
ROD  394  39,813  10009%  21%  69%
total  1,835  57,346  3026%
Sucre  4,581  21,202  363%  94%  44%
Camargo  244  2,214  809%  5%  5%
ROD  56  24,374  43540%  1%  51%
total  4,881  47,790  879%
Tarija  3,219  10,063  213%  68%  35%
Yacuiba  648  4,743  632%  14%  17%
ROD  841  13,893  1552%  18%  48%
total  4,708  28,699  510%
Trinidad  480  4,892  920%  67%  22%
Riberalta  87  6,599  7501%  12%  30%
ROD  154  10,393  6645%  21%  47%
total  721  21.884  2937%
Cobija  99  502  408%  99%  57%
ROD  1  379  63067%  1%  43%
total  99  881  787%
Total  223,525  608,280  172%  ------  -------
Sources: Ministry  of Finance,  Ministry of Social Communication
1995 totals estimated due to incomplete reporting of budget data by both cities.
ROD = Rest of Department
SThe most important  change  wrought  by decentralization,  however,  is to the
composition  of investment. In our results  in section  3 below, local government  provides a
level of public goods different from central  government  due to its more accurate  detection  of
local preferences. Figure 2, which shows  the investment  priorities  of central  and local
government  before and after decentralization,  provides  initial evidence  in support  of these
results. The front row corresponds  to central  government  investment  during 1991-93,  and
the rear row to local government  investments  during 1994-96. The differences  are quite
significant. In the years leading  up to 1994  central  government  invested  the largest sums in
transport,  followed  by hydrocarbons,  multisectoral  (a hodgepodge  of projects  difficult  to
categorize),  and energy. Together  these four sectors account  for 73 percent of total public
investment  during 1991-93. But after decentralization  local governments  invest  most
heavily in education,  urban development,  and water & sanitation,  together accounting  for 79
percent of municipal investment  during this period. Of the sectors accounting  for roughly
three-quarters  of total investment  in both cases, central  and local government  do not have
even one in common. Indeed,  we have to descend  to fourth place in the rear row to find a
sector  - transport  - that ranks highly in the front row as well, and even so it's share of the
total has fallen  by five-sixths.  Thus, we find evidence  that local and central  government
have very different  investment  patterns.
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6Lastly, it is instructive  to examine  how investment  was distributed  geographically
among  Bolivia's municipalities  before decentralization,  and compare that to the current
regime. Although detailed  maps of project locations  and types are not currently available,
we can get a very rough sense of the distribution  behind the sums  by examining  figures 3-5
below. These  place all of Bolivia's municipalities  in a row on the horizontal  axis and
measure investment  per capita  as vertical  displacement. If the allocation  of investment  were
extremely skewed in favor of a few municipalities,  we would expect to see most values
lying near the bottom of the graph and a few points strewn high above  them. If the
distribution  of investment  were reasonably  equitable  across space,  we would expect  to see
most points in a broad band at some intermediate  level.
Figure 3, per capita investment  before decentralization,  seems to conform  to the first
pattern. It is certainly skewed,  with investments  in one district 6 of over Bs.50,000  per head,
and two more 7 in the neighborhood  of Bs.20,000  per head, while the vast majority  seem to
sit on or near zero. Compare  this to the national  average  for this period of Bs.  1,400  per head
and we see the extent of the imbalance. But the degree of skewing  itself distorts the vertical
axis and compresses  the lower range,  where most of the values are. We turn to Figure 4,
which excludes  the upper twelve observations  and shows only those below Bs.2,000  per
capita, in order to examine  these more carefully. Though  the distribution  now appears  less
unequal,  there is still monotonically  increasing  density  as we move downwards,  and a
preponderance  of observations  on or near the horizontal  axis - 146 in fact, or half of the 298
in the plot. Our initial impression  is confirmed. Investment  under centralized  government
was terrifically  skewed  in favor of a few municipalities  that received  enormous sums, a
second group where investment  was significant  and the bottom half of districts  that received
nothing. Compare  this with figure  5, which shows municipal  investment  after
decentralization.  This chart shows  no district over Bs.700  per capita, a broad band with
greatest density  between  Bs.100-200,  and only a few  points touching  the axis. Average
municipal  investment  for this period  is Bs.208  per capita,  and thus our band contains  the
mean. (The investment  sums here are much lower because they exclude central  government
funds.) The overall distribution  is thus much smoother  and more equitable  than figure  4.
Although  these are crude indicators,  it would seem that central government,  with a much
larger budget and free rein over all of Bolivia's municipalities,  chose an unequal distribution
of investment  across space,  while decentralized  government  distributes  public investment
more evenly throughout  the country.
6 Sabaya, Oruro, population 2,074.
7 Chimore, Cochabamba, site of major highway works, and Ascenci6n de Guarayos, Santa Cruz.
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83.  Theory
3.1 The  Literature
Economists  and political  scientists  have often disagreed  on the question  of the
needs-responsiveness  of central  v. local government. This is largely due to the focus that
each discipline  gives to the problem. Economists  such as Oates and Besley and Coate (see
below) tend to assume a better match between local government  outputs and local
preferences,  and accordingly  find local government  preferable  when this advantage  is not
outweighed  by spillovers  or inefficiencies  in central  government  provision  of public services
arising  from distortions  in their financing  or production  and allocation. Economists  do not
agree on how this better matching  come about,  however,  with some ascribing  it primarily  to
the character  of the information  involved,  and others to local elections  or institutions.
Political scientists,  on the other hand, (see for example  Crook  and Sverrisson  (1999)  and
Smith (1985))  tend to concentrate  more on interest group capture  of the local political
process, and the distortions  of political  representation  in small electoral  environments.
When these  phenomena exist,  interest groups  will gain a decisive  influence  over local
government,  and decentralization  will tend to favor these small local groups
disproportionately  over everyone  else. In this context,  centralization  can be preferable,  as
interest groups  which are sufficiently  big locally  to distort  the local political process  will
tend to be small in comparison  to national  government,  which can then match policy  to
(general) local needs in a disinterested  fashion. We incorporate  specific  forms of these
insights into our model and then test them below.
We first examine  the empirical  literature  on decentralization,  and then turn to theory.
A large part of the empirical  work on decentralized  provision of public services  reports
mixed results which, taken together,  are inconclusive. Much of this literature approaches
the subject from a very broad perspective,  examining  such issues as fiscal flows, taxation,
expenditure  and investment  alongside  very different  questions such as managerial
efficiency,  government  responsiveness  and political representativeness.  The breadth  of
these studies' scope combined  with their and small sample size  make controlling  empirically
for all the exogenous economic,  social  and institutional  factors  involved in decentralization
impossible. They also generally  fail to specify a coherent  theoretical  framework  which
credibly links all of the phenomena  in question  to specific decentralization  measures  in very
different national  and cultural  contexts. Attempting  to summarize  such work can be a
frustrating  task as its findings  are both numerous and diverse,  and isolating cause-and-effect
relationships  is difficult. Examples  of the results in Andersson,  Harsman and Quigley,
(1997),  Bennet (1993), Cheema  and Rondinelli  (1983),  Rondinelli  et al. (1984),  Rondinelli
(1981), and Veira (1967) include:
91.  The performance  of decentralized  administrative  units in Algeria, Libya and Tunisia
has been positive in some cases, but has not always met the original goals of policy
reformers.
2.  Decentralization  and privatization  of state activities  have a tendency  to create greater
inequities  among communities  and regions with different  levels of organizational
capacity,  opening  the door for local elites  to play a disproportionate  role in the
planning and management  of projects.
3.  Devolution  in Papua New Guinea  increased  popular  participation  in government,
and has improved  the planning,  management  and coordination  capacity of provincial
administrators,  but has added  to government  bureaucracy  and so weakened  it's
ability  to attract  foreign  investment  and stimulate  long-term economic  growth.
4.  Decentralization  has increased  the access  of people in previously  neglected  rural
regions and local communities  to central  government  resources,  if only
incrementally,  in most of the developing  countries  where it has been tried.
5.  The administrative  and technical capacity  of local organizations  is said to be slowly
improving,  and new organizations  have been established  at the local level to plan
and manage development.
6.  National development  strategy  now increasingly  takes account of regional and local
level planning.
7.  The absence  of or weakness  in supporting  institutions  needed to complement  the
managerial  capacity  of local governments,  as well as weaknesses  in the linkages  and
interaction  between  local and central administrations,  have led  to disappointing
results from decentralization  in Africa and Asia.
Such studies  tend to show that decentralization  has achieved  moderate  success in
some countries,  moderate failure  in others, and both in many, with the underlying  reasons
poorly identified. It is, as a result,  difficult  to judge whether  specific decentralization
"failures" were due to inappropriateness  of the policies implemented  or weaknesses  in their
implementation,  and more difficult  still to recommend  improvements.
The theoretical  debate on the effects  of decentralization  on social  welfare and
efficiency  is of higher quality. In terms of productive  efficiency,  central  government should
be naturally superior  so long as returns are at least slightly  increasing. Any economic  case
for decentralization  must therefore  invoke a counterbalancing  source  of efficiency  in which
local government  has an advantage. Different  authors  have approached  the problem in
different  ways. Tibet's (1956)  seminal work,  reviewed in Rubinfeld  (1987),  posits a world
where individuals  move  costlessly  among  localities  that offer different levels of provision of
a public good, and finds that the competitive  equilibrium  in locational  choices  which results
provides an efficient  allocation  of local public goods. Though  the starting-point  for many
Ioanalyses  of decentralization,  this work ignores central-government  provision of public
goods, and is thus an inappropriate  foundation  for the present  empirical study. More
importantly,  it assumes  a highly  mobile  population and fixed  governments,  which, more
than unrealistic,  we consider  exactly  backwards. It seems self-evident  that government  is
the relatively  mobile element  in most local democratic  systems,  changing  every electoral
period or two, whereas the population  is essentially  fixed  over the 4-5 years that electoral
periods typically  comprise. By invoking  infinitely  transportable  individuals  as the
mechanism  which  joins the supply  of public goods  to demand,  Tiebout fundamentally
misses the point. "Voting with one's feet" in this way is undoubtedly  a valid mechanism  for
preference  revelation  at the margins,  and may be more important  for particular  public goods,
such as education. But the principal  mechanism  for  joining demand  and supply must
involve the political  process. Indeed  this is arguably  why local government  exists at all.
Oates (1972)  examines  heterogeneity  in tastes and spillovers  from  public goods
through a model in which local govemment  can tailor public goods  output to local tastes,
whereas central  government  produces  a common  level of public goods  for all localities. He
finds that decentralization  is preferred  in systems  with heterogeneous  tastes and no
spillovers;  with spillovers  and no heterogeneity,  centralization  is superior  on efficiency
grounds. But Oates' results rest largely on his assumption  of uniform central  provision  of
public goods  which, though an empirical  regularity,  is theoretically  ungrounded  and
problematic  when viewed in the Bolivian  context. Close scrutiny  of the data (see section 2.2
above) shows  that central government  investment  patterns  were non-uniform  during the
period we examine. Investment  flows  were concentrated  in a few municipalities  to such an
extent that public investment  actually  became uniform  after decentralization.  We thus
require a theory,  which does not restrict central  government  choice so strongly. Besley and
Coate (1998)  provide a model in which this restriction  is lifted. Like Oates,  they invoke
uniform  taxation  to finance  public goods  provision. But they then devise a model of central
policymaking  in which elected  representatives  bargain  over public goods  provision  in
multiple  districts. For heterogeneous  districts,  they find that decentralization  continues  to be
welfare superior  in the absence  of spillovers,  but centralization  is no longer superior  when
spillovers  are present. They also find that higher  heterogeneity  reduces  the relative
performance  of centralization  for any level of spillovers. This model is both more
representative  of how real central governments  operate, and more in keeping  with the facts
of the Bolivian transition  from centralized  to decentralized  provision. Our results below can
be interpreted  as an indirect  test of their findings, given  reasonable  assumptions  about
representative  local utility functions. Thus construed  our results  weakly support  their
findings.
Bardhan and Mookherjee  (1998)  develop a model of public service  provision  which
examines  the implications  of decentralization  for the targeting  and cost-effectiveness  of
public expenditure. They find that for provision  of a merit good available  on competitive
11markets to the poor, decentralization  dominates  with respect to intercommunity  targeting
and cost-effectiveness,  though not necessarily  for intracommunity  targeting. For the
provision of infrastructure,  decentralization  dominates  only if local governments  are not
vulnerable  to capture, local government  has adequate  financing,  interjurisdictional
externalities  do not exist, and local governments  have all the bargaining  power vs. public
enterprise  managers. Somewhat  more tangentially,  Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997)
examine  how the separation  of powers  can lead to political accountability.  They examine
how voters can combine incentives  produced  by elections  and the separation  of powers to
control  moral hazard and reduce  politicians' rents under a variety of constitutional  regimes
(presidential,  parliamentary,  etc). Under appropriate  checks  and balances, they find that
separation  of powers helps voters elicit  information  about  both politicians  and the state of
nature. Though it examines  a different  question,  this paper is highly  relevant  to our
empirical  work, as the separation  of powers  is central  to the design of the Bolivian system of
decentralization.
3.2  The Model
A country is made up of T districts,  each with population  nj where the subscriptj
denotes district. Individuals,  subscripted  i, have linear utility Ui = xi + 6b(gj) where  xi is the
amount of private good consumed  by individual  i, gj is the amount  of public good available
in districtj, and 0i is individual  i's preference  for public good  gj. We use 0,,, to denote the
local median preference  for the public good in districtj. We define local welfare as median
utility, Umj  = Xmj + 03mjb(gj).  The function  of government  is to provide  public goods,  which it
finances  with a local head tax. We allow central  government  to have a cost advantage  in the
provision of public goods,  such that the head tax needed  to finance a given level of
provision  under central government  is ag/nj with O<ac<1,  whereas the tax under local
government  is g/nj. This cost advantage  can derive from various sources,  such as central
government's superior technical  knowledge  or an organizational  advantage  which lowers
the cost of complex  public goods,  or traditional  economies  of scale. 8'9 We also assume that
local government  ascertains  0°m  accurately,  whereas central  government  ascertains  0°m  with
probability  p and 0-j  with probability  (1  -p). Probability  varies as pe [O,1],  and we define 0.
mj  as an unrestricted  value of 0 other than O..
Under decentralization,  local government's  problem in districtj is
max [0.b(g)  &  (1)
8 Certain types of public health interventions,  for example, require specialized technical knowledge which
central govermment  may be able to obtain more cheaply than local government.
9  Note that ct=l  implies no cost advantage.
12where for simplicity  we drop all subscriptsj. Local government  thus maximizes  provision
of the public good given  median local preference,  which it finances  with a head tax. Taking
first-order  conditions  and re-arranging,  we get
b'(g)=  1  (2)
The level of public good provided  by local government  is thus an implicit  fimction  of Om,
the median preference  for the public good, and of the population  n. Citizens  receive the
level of public good that they prefer,  which they pay for fully.
Central  government's problem is
max  j,(p9,+(  p)O_.j)(gj  EZ  nj  (3)
We solve the equation  for districtj. Taking  first-order  conditions  and rearranging  we get
Y(g)  =(S  +(a  (4)
nl(Ip  0  + (1 -)  pl)o-
The level of public good provided  by central  government  is thus an implicit function
not only of local median preference  and population,  but also of the probability  that central
government  correctly  assesses local preferences,  the difference  between "true" local
preferences and those otherwise  ascertained  by central government,  and central
government's cost advantage.
Hereafter we refer to the amounts  of the public good provided  in equilibrium  by
local and central  governments,  defined  by equations  (2) and (4) respectively,  as gi and gc.
We assume that b"(g)<O  and thus that utility  is a strictly  concave function  of g. Comparing
the two equations,  it is easy to see that, ceteris  pan bus, public goods  provision under central
government  will be higher  than under local government  when the former has a cost
advantage  (a<l).  Citizens  will prefer central  government  which, for a given head tax
levied, provides more of the public good than does local government. This is clear from
figure 6(a), where central government's  cost advantage  changes  the slope of the budget line,
and allows the residents  ofj to move from a local-government  equilibrium  on U 1 to the new
tangency on U, where Ue>Ui.
13Athough  the symmetric  misestimation  of local preferences  is a desirable feature of
the model on grounds  of generality,  it is not clear that it is relevant  to the experience  of
Bolivia  Section  2 shows that central  government  ignored  one-half  of Bolivia's
municipalities  in the period before  decentralization,  and qualitative  evidence  presented  in
Faguet (2000b)  indicates  that central underinvestment,  not overinvestment,  was the
persistent complaint  from the grass-roots  level.
For the sake of simplicity,  we assume from this point on that 0-.m  = 0 and analyze
central government's assessment  of local preferences  via the pOrn  term. The central
government  equilibrium  is now defined  by b '(gd)  = od(np0,,d.  Where  p<I, central
govermnent  underestimates  local  preferences,  and ceteris  paribus public goods provision
will be lower than under local government. This is equivalent  to comparing  points 1 and 2
in figure 6(b). Because there is no cost advantage,  the budget  line remains  the same and
citizens  consume  less g but more x. Choosing  central  government  entails  moving to a lower
indifference  curve Uc<Ul,  and citizens  prefer  local government  provision. 10 When p=1 the
center accurately assesses  local preferences,  provision is equal to that under local
government (point 1 below), and citizens  are indifferent  between the two regimes.
Figure 6: Utility Under  Central  vs. Local  Government
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'0 Allowing central government to overestimate  local preferences does not substantively change the
analysis. In this case the center would overinvest  in g,, and a new equilhbrium  would occur at the lower
intersection of U, and the budget line in figure 6(b). The restriction liniits the scope of our results, but not
their substance.
14But this analysis  begs the question  of which effect dominates. By setting  b '(gd)
b '(gd)  we can find critical  values for the indifference  points at which the countervailing
effects are equal. It is straightforward  to see that if a =p, citizens  will be indifferent
between  central and local government,  as the center's inaccuracy  in assessing  local
preferences is counterbalanced  by its cost advantage,  and provision of g,=gl. If a>p, the
cost advantage  is dominated  by the center's inaccuracy  in measuring  local preferences,  and
gc<gI.  Citizens  will prefer local government. If a<p, then the center's cost advantage
outweighs its inability  to perceive  local preferences  accurately,  and gc>g,. Citizens  prefer
central government. These results are summarized  in figure 7.
Figure 7.  Indifference  condition:
b (g)=  b (g,)>  a  =  I
Assuming  Condition  Result  Preference
O- =O  Ia>p  gc<gl  Local
-m-  0  a<p  gc>gl  Central
For simplicity,  the analysis  above  depicts  the function  of the public sector  as the
provision of a single  public good g, and examines  the effects  of competing  political and
institutional  factors  on that provision. In reality,  of course, local and central  governments
provide many  public and private goods  and services,  and perform a large variety of
functions  which this approach  is too simple  to capture. Cost advantage  and assessment
inaccuracies  are likely to affect these different  activities  in different  ways. Section  4
examines  this question  empirically  by comparing  central  and local investment  patterns
across ten different sectors for Bolivia before and after a radical  decentralization  reform.
We investigate  whether  public investment  patterns were different  under local government
than under central  government,  and if so what economic  and social factors  explain  this
difference.
4.  Empirical  Tests:  Decentralization  and  Investment
4.1 Methodology
Our objective  is to test whether  decentralization  changed  the pattern of public sector
investment  in Bolivia, and if so to find the determinants  of that change. It is possible  that
public investment  did not change  with decentralization.  In this case decentralization  may be
15desirable for political reasons of representation,  for example,  or undesirable  for reasons of
administrative  effectiveness.  But from an economic  perspective  decentralization  and
centralization  would be largely equivalent. On the other hand, if decentralization  did change
investment  patterns it becomes  important  to try to characterize  this change in terms of
welfare and distribution,  and determiine  which social and institutional  factors  were most
important  in defining  it. Ideally we would  measure public goods  in quality-adjusted  units of
output, separated  by type. But such information  is unavailable  for Bolivia, and instead  we
measure investment  inputs in the form of resources expended  on public investment  projects.
This approach  has the advantage  of using natural,  noncontroversial  units, and of facilitating
comparisons  across  different sectors. We separate  these flows into 13 distinct sectors,
Education,  Urban Development,  Water & Sanitation,  Transport,  Health, Energy,
Agriculture,  Water Management,  Communications,  Industry  & Tourism,  Multisectoral,
Hydrocarbons,  and Mining & Metallurgy,  and analyze  the first ten. We drop Multisectoral
because it includes  a sufficient  diversity  of projects as to be functionally  meaningless  as a
category, and thus difficult  to interpret. We ignore  Hydrocarbons  and Mining because
almost no municipalities  invest  in either, rendering  comparisons  across  regimes impossible.
For each of the remaining  ten sectors  we estimate  the model,
Gmt  =  I 3 Cam  +  1 32CLm +  0338t  + £mt  (5)
where am  and 6t are vectors of state and year dummy  variables  as per above,  and a*m is the
product of am and a decentralization  dummy  variable  which takes the values 0 before 1994
and 1 after (i.e., postdecentralization). 11 We thus decompose  investment  patterns into three
terms: a state effect,  am,  which captures  all of the characteristics  of a state fixed in time, a
year effect,  °t,  which captures  year shocks  and time-specific  characteristics,  and a
decentralization-interacted  state effect,  U*m, which captures  state-specific  characteristics
commencing  in 1994  which were previously  absent. As decentralized  public goods
provision  began in 1994,  this term will capture the effects of local government,  local civic
associations  and other local institutions  that sprang  up with the reform, and social and
political dynamics  more generally  that impact  upon local government  but lay dormant  under
central  rule. Our data cover the period 1987-96.
We then perform three tests:
1.  P1=,2  Means test. This is a simple  t-test to determine  whether  the means of the am
and a*m coefficients  are significantly  different for each sector. Significantly  different
coefficients  indicate  that decentralization  caused  a change  in national  investment
patterns in a given  sector  through the effects  and actions  of local governments.
Thus a*m  takes  the value  0 for all municipalities  and  all years  before 1994,  and  is identical  to ac for all
years  firom  1994  onwards.
162.  PIrn  =  P2m Individual  tests. This F-test checks  municipality-by-municipality  whether the
decentralization-interacted  state coefficients  are different  from the simple  state
coefficients  for investment  in a given  sector. A significant  F-test constitutes  evidence
that decentralization  caused  a change  in local investment  patterns  in a particular
municipality. Significance  in many  municipalities  constitutes  strong  evidence  (stronger
than above)  that decentralization  changed  national  investment  patterns.
3.  Lastly,  we place the differences  in state dummy  coefficients  on the left-hand side (LHS),
and estimate  the model,
P2rNI3ml=  gSm +  IlZm  +  Cm  (6)
for each of ten sectors, where S is a scalar or vector of the existing stock of public
services  (variously  defined,  as we will see below) at an initial  period, and Z is a vector of
institutional  and civic variables,  both indexed  by municipality  m. This approach  allows
us to isolate those changes  in investment  patterns  resulting from a move  to a
decentralized  regime, and then find its determinants.  Notice that equation (6) is a
general-form  and not structural  model, and hence our results will not be sensitive  to
specific  theoretical  assumptions.
Our LHS variable  should  by construction  be unrelated  to all factors  which remain
constant  between the two periods, and thus we omit socioeconomic,  regional and other
variables (used in Faguet 2000a) which do not vary between the centralized  and
decentralized  regimes. We will employ  these variables  elsewhere  to investigate  the
determinants  of public sector  investment  under each regime separately,  where a richer menu
of explanatory  variables is called for. We assume that the variables  in Z, as well as the stock
of public services  in the ten sectors  of interest  to us, S, are constant over the period in
question. For most of the demographic  and socioeconomic  variables  in question,  which
tend to show change that is statistically  significant  only over longer  periods of time, this is
reasonable. It is less reasonable  in the case of the S variable. Unfortunately  the data leave
us no choice.
The huge number  of variables  that might enter Z permit literally  hundreds  of
specifications  of equation (6) above. To facilitate  analysis,  and in order to combine  very
specific variables  into more  meaningful  and conceptually  defensible  indicators,  we
characterize  these variables according  to the following  groups:
1.  Civil Institutions  3.  Training  & Capacity-Building
2.  Private Sector  4.  Information  Technology  5.  Project  Planning
and construct  principal  component  variables  (PCVs) for each. Principal component  analysis
is a data reduction  technique  in which variables are added  together linearly  in order  to find
the unit-length  combination  which maximizes  variance. This is explained  in detail  in Annex
1 below. Our interpretations  of the PCVs is summarized  in Figure 8. The PCVs and their
17constituent  variables,  as well as variables  of need, are summarized  in figure  A1.2. Equation
(6) can thus be written as
P2m7PI  =  CSm  +  IliZim  +  ...  +  'l 5Z5m +  Cm,  (7)
where subscripts 1 to 5 denote the groups above.
Figure 8: Interpretation of PCVs
PCV  Interpretation  - Variable  increases  in... listed in order  of
PCV Group  No.  importance,  where applicable (see Annex 1 for details)
Civil  Institutions  I  Strength  of local  civil  institutions  and  organizations
Training  & Capacity-Building  1  Intensity  of the local  capacity-building  efforts  undertaken
by/for  local  government
Project  Planning  1  Inforned  project  planning  which  follows  consensual  and
open  procedures
In theoretical  terms,  the main coefficient  of interest is 4, which we interpret  as an
indicator  of the degree to which investment  is based on need. We define "need"  as the
marginal  utility  arising from a particular  type of public service,  N = U'(g), where  N is need
and utility is defined  as in the model in section 3.2. In the language  of the model,  we can let
0,,=U'(g). Hence need falls  as the stock of g rises, and vice versa. We use two types of
information  as indicators  of the stock of public services:  (1) the penetration  rates 12 of public
services  or benefits in the local population,  r, or the population  without access  to the same,
1  -r,13 and (2) the initial per-capita stock of infrastructure (at the outset of decentralization).
Examples of these are: (1) the literacy  and illiteracy  rates,  the share of population  without
water or sewerage;  and (2) the number  of sports  facilities  and markets  per capita in 1994.
Of these we consider  type 1 variables  to be truer indicators  of need, as they better capture
the criterion  of public service  use by the population,  and are likely to be better measures  of
the flow of benefits produced  by public investments. Type 2 variables indicate  existence
more than exploitation  by the local population,  and hence should  be less accurate  indicators
of need. We use type 2 variables in our regressions  when type 1 variables are unavailable.
It is also important  to note that need for us is a relative  concept, rising and falling  with
U'(g).  This is an important distinction, as the semantics of its common usage imply that
need is an absolute, and even discrete, concept, existing in some places (at some times) but
not in others. By contrast,  "need" for us is a continuous  function,  present in different
degrees in all places always.
12  Note that  "rate"  here denotes  a stock  and  not flow  concept.
3 We  use both  for  education,  and  obtain  the expected  variation  in sign  in our  results  (see  below).
18Following  the argument  in section  3.2, we expect  4 to be negative  and significant
when Sm  is measured  by the penetration  rate r, and positive  and significant  when Sm  is
measured  by (1-r). In the analysis  that follows  we assume Sm  is measured  by r. A negative
coefficient  suggests  that decentralized  government  invests more heavily in a type of public
good where it is scarce, and hence  presumably  where it is more strongly  preferred.
Decentralization  would thus lead to a more progressive  investment  pattern in terms of
objective  need than obtained  under centralized  government. A positive  coefficient  implies
that decentralized  government  behaves  regressively,  accentuating  the preexisting  differences
in public goods endowments. We interpret  this as evidence  that the relationship  we posit in
3.2 is exactly  backwards,  and central  government  allocates  public investment  with more
sensitivity  to need than local government. A coefficient  equal to zero suggests  that local
government  does not take the existing  stock of public goods  into account at all in making its
investment  decisions,  implying  that our theory is misguided  and local preferences  should not
appear in the model.
The variables in Z are not included as mere controls,  however. We are interested  in
their coefficients,  i, insofar as they help explain  the institutional,  civic and procedural
determinants  of decentralized  investment  decisions,  and so constitute  indirect  tests of our
theoretical  argument  above. The arguments  put forward  by political scientists 14 for local
government's superior  assessment  of local preferences  and needs include greater sensitivity
to grass-roots  demand, greater accessibility  of local lobby groups  to local government,  and
greater political accountability  to the local populace. Some of the ways in which this can
happen include the use of participative  planning  techniques,  and the existence  of private
sector and civic organizations  that are strong and dynamic. Remember  that these factors
were not relevant  to central decisionmaking,  which occurred  in the center. Hence  we
interpret  positive  coefficients  on these PCVs as weak evidence  that local government
assesses preferences  more accurately  than central  government,  implying that the value of p
is less than 1 and the difference  between  real preferences and those perceived  by the center
(0(m-0-m)  is high.
4.2 Results
Figure 9 shows  our results from the means test PI  =  02.  Mean values are
significantly  different  at the 0.1 percent level for education,  water & sanitation,  agriculture,
transport,  urban development  and communication,  and at the 1 percent level for industry  &
tourism and water management.  In health, values are significantly  different at only the 13
percent level, and even worse for energy. The evidence  is that decentralization  changed
national  investment  patterns in each of the first eight sectors. Examination  of the P2 values
indicates  that the effect of local government  on average investment  under decentralization
was to increase  investment  in education,  urban development,  water  management  and
14 See for example Wolman in Bennet (1990).
19perhaps health, no change in energy,  and decrease investrnent  in agriculture,  transport,
communication,  industry and tourism,  and (puzzlingly  given the increase in water
management)  water & sanitation. But figure 10 shows  that the number  of municipalities
investing  in these sectors increased  for all except agriculture. This implies  that the
concentration  of investment  fell, as more municipalities  invested  in a large  number of
(often-smaller)  projects in nine sectors.
Figure  9.
Test  1: Coefficients  Equal?  Test  1-f2  - 0
Test  Test
Sector  Variable  Mean  Std Error  t-statistic  P Value
Education  3  0.00128  0.00032  -22.798  0.0000
P  2  0.01685  0.00042
Water & Sanitation  D  0.00374  0.00043  17.343  0.0000
P2 -0.01174  0.00049
Agriculture  D  0.00867  0.00080  8.667  0.0000
P  2  -0.00535  0.00086
|Transport  _  0.05464  0.00890  5.967  0.0000
D 2  -0.05152  0.00890
Urban Development  I  0.00307  0.00049  -5.324  0.0000
P 2  0.00791  0.00053
|Communication  D  p  0.00191  0.00032  4.011  0.0001|
m  2  -0.00055  0.00031
Industry&  Tourism  P1 0.00101  0.00023  3.768  0.0002
P  2  -0.00071  0.00023
Water Management  I1  0.00075  0.00018  -2.932  0.0034
2  0.00182  0.00020
Health  0,  000258  0.00038  1.540  0.1238
1520.00141  0.00041
20Figure 10: Number of Municipalities
Receiving Investment, by Sector
(in municipality-years)  %
Sector  Before  After  Change
Urban Development  66  675  923%
Education  75  685  813%
Health  95  484  409%
Water Management  46  175  280%
Communications  38  97  155%
Water & Sanitation  202  506  150%
Energy  180  259  44%
Industry & Tourism  44  60  36%
Transport  357  444  24%
Agriculture  343  309  -10%
Figure 11 shows the number  of municipalities  where we can reject  the hypothesis
13Im  =  B2m,that  is, the number  of municipalities  where decentralization  changed  investment
patterns significantly  during the first three years. As we might expect, decentralization  did
not change investment  equally  in all sectors. The test is significant  in about Y 4 of
municipalities  for water & sanitation  and education,  and in '/ of municipalities  for urban
development  and water management,  but in only '/5  of municipalities  for agriculture  and
health and fewer in other sectors. This test suggests  that investment  pattems changed
significantly  for water & sanitation,  education,  urban development  and water management,
did not change for industry & tourism,  energy,  communication  and transport,  with
agriculture  and health on the border between  significantly  different  and not. It is notable
that the only sector  which fails  both tests is energy. Taking into account  our results from
test 1, we conclude  that agriculture  spending  did change significantly  between  the two
periods, while for health it may have but the evidence  is inconclusive. Thus we add two
sectors to the two above for which decentralization  did not significantly  change investment
patterns across  Bolivia's 311 municipalities.  From this point we focus our analysis  on water
& sanitation,  education,  urban development,  water management,  agriculture  and
(marginally)  health.
21Figure ll:Test  2: Coefficients  Equal?
Test PIm-P2m  = 0
No.  %
Sector  Significant Significant
Water  & Sanitation  224  76%
Education  209  71%
Urban  Development  107  36%
Water  Management  105  36%
Agriculture  65  22%
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We can best understand  this result  by considering  the following:
1.  One-half  of all municipalities  in Bolivia  received  no public investment  at all during the
three years before decentralization,  and these are for the most part the poorest
municipalities. As all municipalities  have funds  to invest  postdecentralization,  the most
pronounced  changes  in investment  patterns  are accounted  for by the poorest
municipalities.
2.  Given high levels of poverty  and low levels of public investment  before
decentralization,  poor municipalities  have a need for investment  in more than one sector.
3.  Rather than spread resources  around  thinly, most reasonably  choose to concentrate
investment  in a few,  high-priority  sectors  during the initial  years of decentralization.
Hence our results are driven  by investment  by the poorest districts  responding  to their
greatest needs. By revealed  preference  we can infer that local administrations  in these areas
prioritize  basic social services  projects above  productive  projects,  and productive  (i.e.,
income-enhancing)  projects  in turn above  economic  infrastructure. Hence they will tend to
invest in education  and water before  agriculture,  and agriculture  before  transport  or
communication. Because only a few years of post-decentralization  data are available,  we
expect the F-test to fail in low-priority  sectors,  as poor municipalities  received little  or no
investment  under central  government  and continue  to invest little under decentralization.  In
high-priority  sectors, however,  investment  will leap upwards  from a very low base if
decentralization  matters. This is indeed what happens. Decentralization  leads  to an increase
in investment  in water & sanitation  and education  in 3/4 of all municipalities,  and urban
22development  and water  management  in 1/3.  There are moderate  changes  in investment
patterns in agriculture  and health, and very little change in transport,  communication,  energy
and industry & tourism. We conclude  that decentralization  did change  the pattern of
Bolivian public investment,  and this difference  was strongest  in the social services  and
urban development.
Test 3 investigates  the determinants  of the difference  in dummy state variables,  P2  -
[I, equivalent  to tfie  increase in investment  due to decentralization.  We examine  our results
sector-by-sector,  beginning  with education.
Education
Figure 12:
Test 3:  P2m  Im  =  IISm  + fliZm  +  *-- +  5Z5m +  Sm
Model*
Independent Variable  I  II  III  IV  V
Private Sector  PCV1  -0.000983 -0.00121  -0.00106  -0.0003 -0.00056
(-2.466)  (-3.004)  (-2.689)  (-1.004)  (-1.619)
Civil Institutions  PCVl  0.000973  0.00101  0.00103
(1.752)  (1.774)  (1.839)
Information  Technology  PCV  I  0.00118
(1.010)
Illiteracy  Rate (Over-6's)  0.00018
(2.505)
Local Education  Authority  0.005603  0.00534  0.00543  0.0053  0.00479
(1.421)  (1.356)  (1.378)  (1.354)  (1.379)
R-square  0.0176  0.0136  0.0162  0.0155  0.0172
lProb>F  0.001  0.0025  0.0016  0.0128  0.0104
* OLS regressions  reported  with robust standard  errors  t-stats in parentheses;  PCV  I1st
principal  component  variable.
23All of our models for education  are  jointly significant  at the 2 percent level or
higher. We see that investment  nrses  under decentralization  where the illiteracy  rate is
higher,  and investment  is thus  progressive  in termns  of need. This implies  that local
government  is more sensitive  to local need than central  government. This finding  is not
sensitive  to specification  or to the measure  of illiteracy  used, as we see in Figure 12, where
the literacy  rate is significant  and negative. In terns of the model of section  3.2, our results
imply  that p<l, and hence that the center  assesses local preferences  less accurately  than
local government. Educational  investment  falls  where the private sector  is stronger,  a
finding  which is again insensitive  to specification. This is most likely because private firmns
lobby for resources  to flow to other  sectors where they stand to profit more. Our results for
urban development  (below)  support  this interpretation.  Civil Institutions,  by contrast,  lead
to an increase in investment  after decentralization,  suggesting  grass roots support for
education  (i.e., parents  worred about  their children). Participative  planning  methodologies
have no effect on investment,  nor do infonnation  technology  or local training and capacity-
building activities.
Water  &  Sanitation
Figure  13:
Test 3:  2m-Pm  = GS.  + TllZlm +  *-  +  15Z5m + £
Model*
Independent  Variab3le  I  00  III  IV
Private Sector PCV  0.000123  -0.000856  -0.000712
(0.130)  (-1.265)  (-1.058)
C'ivl  regrssiuions  rPorte  wihroutstnad0  ros01tt2i2arnhse;7V1~s
Inforrnation Technology PCVI  -0.000196
(-0.163)
%  Pop.  w/out  Water  0.~000157
(1.791)
R-square  0.0323  0.0064  0.0320  0.0302
I'rob>F  0.Q000  0.0743  0.0000  0.0000
*OLS regressions reported with robust standard errors t-stats in parentheses; PCVI =Ilst
pricipal  component  variable.
24All multivariable  models for water & sanitation  are  jointly significant  beyond the 0.1
percent level, and even  the univariable  model is significant  at the 10 percent level.
Investnent rises under decentralization  where more people have no sewerage. It also rises
where the percent  of the population  without access  to drinking  water increases,  though this
finding  is sensitive  to specification  and drops  out when other variables  are included  in the
model. Thus local govermments  invest  more where need is greatest,  and investment  is
progressive  in terms of need. This implies  that p<I in the model above. Participative
planning methodologies  are significant  and negative,  thus decreasing  investment,  and the
private sector  and civil institutions  are both insignificant. This last result is surprising  given
the positive effect of civil institutions  on investment  in education.
Water Management
Figure 14:
Test  3: P2m  PI.m= Sm  + 1liZ1m  + *--  + T1 5Z 5m  + Em
Model*
Independent  Variable  I  If  III  IV
PrivateSectorPCVi  0.000171  0.000170  0.000056  0.000155
(0.602)  (0.609)  (0.405)  (0.758)
C Post  reguesions  rtedwith  PCVI  -0.0001re
pInciaform  ptonTentoarale.  CI-0004
% Pop. w/etwerager  to  P  no  - 0.00013n methods  of  0
(1.793)  (2.4879)  180.75
Rsq.w/ublic  Standpip  0.001014  013  0016
lProsqaF  0.0832  0.0142  0.0824  0.0163
* OLS  regressions  reported  with  robust  standard  errors  t-stats  in parentheses;  PCV  I = I st
principal  component variable.
** "Other" Sewerage  refers to non-public-utility,  non-septic-tank  methods of sewerage
disposal.
25The water management  sector  is related  to water & sanitation,  but is broader  in
scope. It includes  such projects as reservoirs  and wastewater  treatment  lagoons, which are
components  of municipal  (potable)  water systems,  as well as levees and storm drainage
works, which are not. In general  the degree  of overlap  between the two sectors is high, and
we use similar indicators  of need for both.
Three of our models are  jointly significant  at the 10 percent level, and a 4th is
significant  at the 15  percent level. Investment  in water & sanitation  is lowest where the
share of population  with no access  to water is highest,  rises as more people  have access  to
public and private standpipes,  and then falls again as internal  plumbing  becomes
widespread. Investment  is also highest  where few people have access  to sewerage,  or access
to rudimentary  sewerage,  and decreases  as municipal  sewerage  systems  become widespread.
These results point to investment  that is progressive  in terms  of need at intermediate  and
high levels of provision,  with a poverty  trap amongst  the most needy. Hence p<I for most
of the population,  but importantly  not for the neediest districts,  where investment  falls.
Amongst  these municipalities  it would seem  that it is local government  that underestimates
local preferences. We return to this idea below. Perhaps surprisingly,  private sector  firms,
civil institutions,  participative  planning  methodologies,  IT and local training  programs have
no effect on investment. Only variables  of need matter. Annex 2 discusses  these results in
greater detail in the context of sequential  demand  curves for water and sanitation  services.
Agriculture
Figure 15:
Test  3: P2m-m  =S.  + T1  IZI.  +  *+  715Z5.  Em
Model*
Independent  Variable  I  II  III
Private Sector PCV  I  -0.000286  -0.000665  -0.000837
(40156)  (-0.466)  (-0.657)
Civil Institutions  PCV1  -0.000401
(40226)
Informnation Technology  PCVI  0.000885
(0.303)
-constant  -0.032749  -0.031594  -0.032157
(-2.936)  (-2.981)  (-2.918)
* OLS regressions  reported with robust standard errors t-stats in
parentheses; PCV1  1st  principal component  variable.
26All of our models are significant  at the 10  percent level. It is notable that even
though agricultural  investment  decreased  after decentralization  - fewer municipalities
invested here (see Figure 10) and the mean difference  in state variables  is negative  and
significant  - investment  nonetheless  increases  with the male malnutrition  rate, a finding
which is insensitive  to specification. This implies  that those municipalities  that did invest in
this sector  after decentralization  did so progressively  according  to need. Hence  p<1 in the
model above. Once again participative  planning techniques  decrease agricultural  investment
under decentralization,  and the number  of private sector enterprises  and civil institutions  has
no effect. Investment  is similarly  unaffected  by local training and capacity-building
programs and installed  IT capacity.
Urban  Development
Figure  16:
Test 3:  32.m-_  =  0  TSm  + 11ZIm  +  *+ 1  5 Z5m  +  Em
Model*
Independent Variable  06  4  III
Private SectorPCVI  0.004749  0.004869  0.005125
(4.486)  (4.804)  (4.704)
Civil Institutions PCV I  0.000439
(0.750)
PCV  11  i  st prnia  copnn  var_iable.11  I|  _  |1
Information  Technology  PCV1  -0.000609
(-0.285)
#Sports  Facilities  per capita**  4.728497  4.758151  4.814974
(1994)  (2.815)  (2.991)  (3.013)
R-square  0.0684  0.0474  0.04741
IProb>F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  l
* OLS  regressions  reported  with robust  standard  errors  t-stats  in parentheses
PCV1I  = I1st  principal  component  variable.
** Defined  as other  than  football  fields,  multi-use  courts  and  coliseums.
27All of our models for urban development  are significant  at the 0.1 percent level. In
this sector we use the initial (i.e.,  predecentralization)  stock of infrastructure  directly  as our
measure of need. Investment  under decentralization  increases  as the initial number  of
markets  per capita increases,  and as the number of general sports  facilities  per capita
increases  as well. Investment  is thus regressive  in terms of need in this sector,  as opposed  to
the others considered  above,  and this finding  is not sensitive  to specification. Thus it would
seem to be central government  that more accurately  assesses local need in this sector,  and
local government  that misestimates  it. Investment  increases  with the number  of private
sector firms, which is as we would expect given  that urban development  projects often result
in lucrative  contacts for these firns.  Investment  is unaffected  by participative  planning
techniques  and civil institutions,  implying  that it is not a high priority at the grass-roots
level. Lastly, neither training  programs  nor IT affect investment  in urban projects.
These results suggest that  we should  modify our model to includepi and  pc, the
probabilities  that local preferences  will  be accurately  assessed  by local and central
governments  respectively. Indeed,  there are sound political economy  reasons related  to
interest group formnation  and collective  action for believing  that local government  will be
more sensitive  to demand  in some sectors than in others. The important  question  would
then become, which form of government  is better at assessing  local preferences,  pi ><  pc?
On the other hand, of the six sectors  we analyze  this is the only one where our indicators of
need are unsatisfying  (type 2 variables  in the characterization  of section  4.1), and the only
one where we find a broadly  regressive  pattern of investrnent  in terms of need. It would
thus seem wise to reestimate  these  equations  with better indicators  before concluding  that
the model is inadequate. We leave  this for future  work.
28Health
Figure 17:
Test3:  2m-ml=  Sm  + 11ltZIm+***+Tl5Z5m+  6m
Model*
Independent  Variable  I  II  III
Private  Sector  PCV1I  0.000348 0.000234 0.000555
(0.527)  (0.526)  (0.992)
Civil  Instituti  ns  PCVI  si  oa00165
(-0.304)
Information  Technology  PCge  -0.001108
(-1.245)
ih  ealth  Care,  Other  variables7  0.000400 0.000400
(1.529) (1.719)  (1.628)
Local  Health  Authorit  n  -0.000754 0.000393 0.000815
(-0.394)  (0.169)  (0.367)
R-square  0.0187  0.0207  0.0202
lProb>F  0.8545  0.6514  0.5682
*OLS  regressions  reported  with  robust  standard  errors
t-stats  in parentheses;  PCV  I = I1st  pTicipal  component  variable
All  of our  health  models  are  collectively  insigniuficant,  and  hence  we cannot  make
any  clainis  based  on them. This  is no great  blow,  however,  as none  of the  variables  in our
main  model  are significant  either.  In the first  alternative  model  "Other"  healtb  care  is
poiive  and  significant,  and  in the second  alternative  it is nearly  so. This  variable  measures
the  perceDtage  of  households  that  have  recourse  to health  care  outside  the fonrmal  public  and
private  health  networks.  We might  interpret  it as an indicator  of pent-up  demand  for  health
services,  and  hence  its positive  coefficient  as weak  evidence  that  local  governments  invested
in health  care  where  demand  was greatest,  and  p<1l.  No other  variables  - the  private  sector,
civil  institutions,  participative  planning,  IT or training  schemes  - appear  to have  any  effect
on investment,  nor do local  sectoral  institutions  in the form  of Local  Health  Authorities.  But
29as we observed above,  none of these models  is collectively  significant,  the small trend we do
find is sensitive  to specification,  and the difference  between state variables  examined above
is marginally  significant  for this sector  in both tests. We thus conclude  that we can make no
claims about investment  in health.
Results for Transport,  Communication,  Energy and Industry  & Tourism,
sectors for which differences  in state variables  are not statistically  significant,  appear for the
sake of completeness  in Annex 3.
4.3 Summary
Our results show that decentralization  significantly  changed  national  public
investment  patterns. Investment  changed  unambiguously  in education,  water & sanitation,
water management,  agriculture  and urban development  after the 1994  reform, and there is
some evidence  that it may have changed  in health, transport,  communication  and industry &
tourism as well. Furthermore,  these changes  are strongly  and positively related  to real local
needs. In education,  water & sanitation,  water  management,  and agriculture,
postdecentralization  investments  are higher  where illiteracy  rates are higher,  water and
sewerage  connection  rates lower, and malnutrition  a greater risk respectively. In a
decentralized  context dominated  by the actions  of some 250 small,  poor municipalities  that
make up 80 percent of the Bolivian total, public investment  is strongest  in human capital and
social services. And within these sectors  investment  is progressive  in terms of need.
Investment  rose by number  of municipalities  in all of the sectors we examine  except
agriculture,  and the effect of local government  on average investment  was positive in the
social sectors and urban development,  and negative  in economic  infrastructure  and
agriculture. We can combine  our various  results to distinguish  between the cost advantage
and needs-assessment  effects  that we posit in section  3. We interpret  the average rise in
investment  (i.e., across all municipalities)  in education,  health,  water management  and urban
development  after decentralization  as due entirely  to the need-orientation  of local
government, and evidence  that the center cannot  produce  these services at lower cost than
the periphery. The fall in average  investment  in agriculture,  by both volume and number of
municipalities,  combined  with the significance  of need, is evidence  that the center was
overinvesting  in this sector,  and that given  the choice municipalities  prefer to redirect
resources elsewhere. The fall in average  investment  by value in water & sanitation,
combined with an increase  in the number  of districts  investing  and the significance  of need,
implies that the central government  concentrated  investment  in too few projects and
districts; local government  thus reallocates  resources  in a larger  number of smaller projects
where need is greatest. And lastly, the systematic  fall in investment  by value throughout
Bolivia in transport,  communication  and industry & tourism,  combined with modest
increases in numbers of municipalities  investing  and the irrelevance  of need, implies weakly
30that the center may have had a cost advantage  in these sectors,  leading volumes  to fall after
decentralization.
After needs, the next most important  indicator  is participative  planning techniques.
We expect such planning techniques  to contribute  to needs-based  investment  insofar as they
help local governments  to sense Om  accurately. But where they enter significantly  their sign
is negative. This may be because such activities  are expensive  and divert resources and
attention from implementing  investment  projects, irnplying  that they may not be
worthwhile. Alternatively,  it could  be due to the avoidance  of projects  that are not desired
by the grass-roots,  implying  that these activities  are valuable. The latter  is only really a
possibility  if there is a general level of overinvestment  in the Bolivian  public sector,  as
otherwise  we would expect good  participative  planning  to increase  investment  in at least
some sectors. We consider  this possibility  highly unlikely,  and conclude  that participative
planning does not seem to improve  local government's  ability  to sense local preferences.
In econometric  terms, the most interesting  single  feature of our results is that the
only terms that are consistently  significant  across  the five principal  sectors we analyze  are
indicators  of need. These relationships  are  robust and insensitive  to specification. By
contrast social,  institutional  and procedural  variables  are infrequently  significant  across
sectors, and seem to account for little total variation. Indeed,  the only effect we find for
private sector firms is to transfer  resources  from education  to urban development. Civil
institutions  are significant  only for education,  where they increase investment,  and
insignificant  everywhere  else. Training,  capacity-building  and IT are insignificant  for all
sectors. This implies that the differences  in investment  patterns chronicled  above are not
related to the number  of private enterprises  or civil institutions,  or driven exogenously  by
training programs or informnation  technology,  but are instead determined  by local needs. We
conclude  that decentralization  led to an increase in investment  in those municipalities  least
well endowed with infrastructure,  and with the worst demographic  indicators  in the
respective  sectors which we examine. This is exactly  the opposite  of what many academics
and policymakers  predict, and what other  researchers  have found  in the past. Given this
finding,  it is imnportant  that we investigate  the social and institutional  mechanisms  that cause
these changes. We turn to these  questions  in Faguet  (2000a) and (2000b).
5.  Conclusions
Our results confirm  that decentralization  did change local and national  investment
patterns in Bolivia, and that local preferences  and needs are key to understanding  these
changes. Taken together, the pattern of centralized  public investment  and the structure  of
the decentralization  program imply that these results are largely driven  by the smallest,
poorest municipalities  investing  newly devolved  public funds in their highest-priority
projects. We find that investment  in education,  water & sanitation,  water management  and
31agriculture  are progressive  in terms of need,  implying, in the language  of our model, that
central  government's p<1. Even in agriculture,  where total investment  fell between  the pre-
and post-decentralization  periods, our evidence  indicates  that the remaining  investment  was
reallocated  amongst  districts according  to need.
The results also point to the existence  of a poverty  trap in the water management
sector,  where decentralized  investment  falls  in the neediest districts  as need increases.
Within this range of the stock of public services,  local government  fails  to respond  to need
and central government  provision  is superior. Our  model can explain this indirectly,  if in
these neediest districts  the costs and complexity  of making initial investments  in water are
so great (from developing  water sources,  laying water  mains and building treatment  plants,
for example)  that local governments  cannot  undertake  them alone,  but once these initial
investments  are made the marginal  costs of extending  the system are manageable. In the
language of the model, central government  has a cost advantage  over local government  for
initial investments,  ax<1,  an advantage  that disappears  at intermediate  and higher levels of
provision.
By demonstration,  this paper seeks  to make a case for conducting  empirical  research
on decentralization  and fiscal federalism  in the marmer  in which we have done. Much of the
empirical  work on decentralization  to date focuses  on the share of national  expenditures
conducted  by different levels of government,  and ignores the many insights waiting to be
uncovered  by moving down  to the level of the local political  economy and conducting a
careful comparison  of spending and investment  patterns  with economic,  institutional,  social
and demographic  indicators. The data presented  here is from one of the poorest countries  in
the Western  hemisphere,  and took years to collect, clean and organize. But as this paper
demonstrates,  its quality is sufficient  to permit significant  and (for many) counter-intuitive
results. Applying  a similar methodology  to more sophisticated  countries  in the region,  not
to mention Europe and North America,  might prove very fruitful.
Lastly, the above  analysis  leaves  open the question  of how political  power is
distributed  in a central  government,  the institutional  mechanisms  by which governments
sense and take up local demand for public services,  and the precise nature of the
organizational  or technical  advantages  or scale economies  which might benefit one level of
government  over another. That is, p, e3m  and a are all exogenous  here. Research is needed
to understand  these processes  and endogenize  them in our models of public goods  provision.
Several authors  have made progress  in this direction  but more work is needed.
32Annex  1. Methodology,  Including Principal  Component  Analysis and
Interpretation
N.B.  This annex is general to all of the  papers originatingfrom  the study "Participatory
Planning and Decentralization  in Bolivia.  " It describes  the strategy  used to arrive at the
principal component  variables  used in this paper as well as Faguet (2000a). Hence some of
the variables  and categories  referred to below do not appear in this  paper but are exploited
elsewhere.
Methodology
Our empirical  strategy  is iterative,  and  begins  by finding  the  best idiosyncratic  model  of
public  investment  for each  of the  ten sectors  of interest.  Hence  we fit the equation
Gm = 4Sm  + rlZ  + cm,  (Al)
separately  for central  public investment  (1991-3)  and local public investment  (1994-7)
where Gm is aggregate  investment  per capita  in the public good subscripted  by municipality,
Sm  is a scalar or vector of the existing stock of public goods  of that type (variously  defined)
at an initial  period, and Z is a vector of socio-economic,  demographic,  regional,  political,
institutional,  administrative  and procedural  variables  which might affect investment
decisions. Our use of the Z term follows  the literature on the demand for public goods
exemplified  by Bergstrom  & Goodman  (1973) and Rubinfeld,  Shapiro and Roberts (1987)
within the context of the available  data. In particular,  no income data is available  at the
municipal  level in Bolivia, and so we substitute  several  alternative  indicators  of income and
wealth, including for example  type of cooking  fuel, and housing size, quality  and related
characteristics. But we expand  the scope of the Z indicators  considerably  from that of
previous authors by including  measures  of the strength  of local political forces as well as
municipal  institutional  capacity. This innovation  allows us to investigate  the micropolitical
basis of local government  decision-making,  which we explore  in detail  in Faguet (2000a).
We allow no constraints  across sectors on the particular  variables  admissible  in Z.
We use the Huber/White  estimator  of variance  to produce  consistent  standard  errors in the
presence of non-identically  distributed  residuals. This produces  ten different  models of
public sector  investnent, one for each sector. Individually  these models are quite
satisfactory,  with high R2  and few variables  insignificant. But because of large variation  in
the specification  of the Z vector,  comparison  across sectors  is problematic. Additionally,  on
a theoretical  level these models  would seem  to assert that public investment  in different
sectors happens according  to different  processes,  in which different  variables  intervene.
This is evidently  unacceptable.
33In our second iteration  we return to equation (Al) and estimate  it, holding the Z
vector constant across all sectors. But we take advantage  of the previous stage  by using
only those variables found  significant  there; in this sense the previous stage constitutes  a
method for reducing  the 1200+  indicators  to a subset of 197. But even so we still suffer
from a dimensionality  problem. We then employ a method of forward and backward
substitution  and elimination  in order to reduce this subset  to 22 variables  encompassing  the
13 categories  of Z, in specifications  of 23-30 variables  overall (see Faguet  2000c, Annex 3).
These models benefit from being readily comparable  across sectors. The ratio of significant
to insignificant  variables  drops sharply  compared to the first stage, however, and R 2 values
are somewhat  lower.
The insignificance  of the variables  chosen is not entirely  separable from the issue of
comparability,  however. It is evident from these results that none of the variables is
significant  in most of the sectors,  and many are significant  in only 2 or 3. How do we
interpret  a given  variable across sectors,  knowing  as we do that an alternative  one from the
same group would produce a different  pattern of significance  and insignificance? The
training & capacity-building  variables  in Faguet 2000c (Annex 3), for example,  are
insignificant  in most of the models. What importance  do we attach to this when we know
from stage 1 that there is at least one alternative  training  variable  which would  be significant
for each sector where the current  ones are not? We evidently  cannot assert for any sector
that politics does not matter;  we must conclude  that the comparability  constraint  forces us to
omit from our models information  that is important  in explaining  investment  behavior.
Indeed,  given that there are 197  variables,  many of them quite specific,  which have
explanatory  power over our dependent  variable,  any subset of 20, 30, or even 100 will omit
valuable information. We require  a solution  which allows us to retain the full breadth of
information,  and yet produce a specification  which is both parsimonious  and comparable.
We turn to principal  component  analysis,  a data reduction  technique  in which the objective
is to find the unit-length  combinations  of explanatory  variables  with the highest variance.
We follow Maddala (1977) in calculating  variables  zi to zk where z is a linear combination
of the x variables,
z, = a,x, + a2x2  + ... + aLxL
z2 = bix,  + b2x2+... + bLxL etc.l5
ranked in order of variance,  with highest  first. Principal component  analysis  regresses  y on
zi, Z2, ... , Zk, where  k < L and z's are constructed  so as to be orthogonal.  So long  as the  z's
chosen represent  combinations  of variables  that have economic  meaning and can be
interpreted,  this affords us a method for estimating  parsimonious  models with limited loss of
information.
15  For further treatment of this topic, see also Greene (1997), and Jackson (1991).
34We calculate  a set of principal  component  variables (PCVs)  based on the raw
variables retained  in stage 1. We discard  all those with low eigenvalues,  as per normal
procedure,  and then find the subset  of the remaining  ones which optimally  estimate  equation
(Al), where Z is a vector of PCVs. Figure Al.l  contains  the eigenvectors  associated  with
each of the PCVs used in this paper. The factor loadings  on the raw variables  can be read
vertically down each column. The numnbered  column  headings  denote which PCV is
referred to. Our interpretation  of each  PCV is explained  below.
Interpretation of PCVs
Civil Institutions: This is an indicator  of the number  organizations  and institutions  of local
civil society. It rises in all the variables,  especially  in the more general measures. We
interpret  it as a proxy for the strength  of local civil institutions.
Private Sector: This PCV rises in the number  of private businesses  registered locally. We
construe  it as an indicator  of the dynamism  of the local private sector.
Training: This variable  rises in categories  of training (i.e., institutional  strengthening)
received  by the municipality  and falls in those requested  but not yet received. Hence we
interpret  it as a measure of the intensity  of capacity-building  efforts undertaken  by/for local
government.
Information  Technology:  This  PCV rises in the IT systems  - hardware  and software
(especially  software)  - at the disposal  of each municipality.
Project Planning:  This PCV loads  positively  where municipalities  use information  on
education  and health when planning  projects,  where sectoral  regulations  are followed  in
water & sanitation,  where a Municipal  Development  Plan exists, and where councilmen  and
oversight  committees  identify investment  projects using the MDP and urban cadaster. It
loads negatively  where the mayor  is the one who identifies  investment  projects,  and where
problems arise  with the Annual Operating  Plan. This is thus a straightforward  indicator  of
informed  project planning which follows  consensual  and open procedures.
35Figure A1.1
CIVIL  INSTITUTIONS  TRAINING
Eigenvectors  Eigenvectors
Variable  1  Variable  1
cv  0.09745  capadpe  0.28556
indig2  0.01988  capcil  0.30671
jvec2  0.29229  capci2  0.2612
otbregi  0.4194  capdis  0.2793
otbregi2  0.43286  caplemu  0.34451
otbs_e  0.42137  caporad  0.38803
otbs_pj  0.42934  capprin  0.37869
otbsoli  0.42372  capprop  0.34559
temacz  -0.14204
temadis  -0.20036
PROJECT  PLANNING  temaorad  -0.22559
Eigenvectors  temaprop  -0.18667
Variable  1
catastur  0.04701
dpoacoor  -0.00839  INFORMATION  TECHNOLOGY
dpoaotro  -0.07581  Eigenvectors
epoaham  0.00306  Variable  1
evalres  0.07426  sitotal  0.51744
idenalc  -0.00973  siotro  0.36119
idencons  0.0145  sisin_ad  0.42748
idencv  0.09214  sisin_ai  -0.27289
idenpdm  0.14818  sisinidp  0.28173
info_ed  0.53349  sicom  0.38812
info_sa  0.51649  impresor  0.3385
pdm94  0.14019
plan_sye  0.56911







Sunmuy of  PEidinpal  Conponent  Variables,  PCV
Constituents,  and Needs Variables
Variabie I  Obs  1Van  St  Dev.  Mn  Max  Vaiiable  Obs  nan  SkI.  1lv.  Mn  Max
fPindpal  Copionent  Variables  pctlr  310 -5.4000E409  1.6762  -28227  4.2889
pcpsl  302 -3.2400E-09  1.5298  -0.3015  18.0787  cv4*e  310  0.2516  0.4346  0  1
eeregcmn  306  202.7255 1229.8060  0  14117  cqxil  310  0.2  0.4006  0  1
eerg ea  306  0.5556  20973  0  30  cax2  310  0.5710  0.4957  0  1
eeregfi  310  2.6097  26.7243  0  454  oWdis 310  0.4871  0.5006  0  1
pcppl  310  2.36001309  1.5915  -2.7175 2.2313  cqiemu  310  0.3452  0.4762  0  1
catutr  310  0.1581  0.3654  0  1  a4txrad 310  0.3  0.4590  0  1
poxoor 310  0.8548  0.9991  0  4  cappin 310  0.3613  0.4812  0  1
doxxhro 310  0.6968  1.1790  0  4  c07pop 310  0.3903  0.4886  0  1
epTa-An 310  0.8355  0.3713  0  1  temxz  310  0.5194  0.5004  0  1
evalres 310  0.8226  0.3826  0  1  ten-ds  310  0.3161  0.4657  0  1
idenac 310  0.7968  0.4030  0  1  ternorad 310  0.5Q65  0.5008  0  1
idcons  310  0.4129  0.4932  0  1  teanpop 310  0.4290  0.4957  0  1
iwNcv 310  0.7323  0.4435  0  1  pritl  310  1.6400O-08  1.5235  -1.5591 5.0864
idenpdn 310  0.3742  0.4847  0  1  sitotal 310  0.4355  0.4966  0  1
nfo_ed  310  0.5581  0.4974  0  1  siotro 310  0.2226  0.4167  0  1
ifo  sa  310  0.5839  0.4937  0  1  sisin ad  310  0.1548  0.3623  0  1
pdm94 310  0.3032  0.4604  0  1  sisin  ai  310  06968  0.4604  0  1
plan  sye  310  0.5839  0.4937  0  1  sisinidp 310  0.3258  0.4694  0  1
reccmu  a  310  0.6839  0.4657  0  1  sicom 310  0.2806  0.4500  0  1
pecil  303 2.4000E09  2.2150  -2.1130  14.5313  inpresor 310  0.2903  0.8737  0  10
cv  310  0.6419  0.4802  0  1  Need  Vaniables
indig2 310  0.6290  3.5208  0  51  sa  _insa  310  32.0264  20.0876  0 85.5147
jvec2  310  8.9548  26.2524  0  247  sa_oto  310  4.3985  7.4206  0 65.2706
otbregi 308  34.25  41.3093  0  299  desmod  294  8.2202  4.4993  0 26.2548
otbregl2 310  46.9226  49.6351  0  339  dilos  310  0.9161  0.2776  0  1
oths_e 307  50.2280  59.0375  0  520  analf  310  30.4638  15.8231  5.5  78.7
othspj  305  43.8557  52.5067  0  416  ed_  alfa  310  69.0462  15.9098  21.2128  94.5433
otbsoli 308  40  43.9176  0  323  edaia6  310  26.5292  13.1925  6.3780  69.7183
dile  310  0.5032  0.5008  0  1
sin alca  310  76.1424  21.8893  14.6586  100
sinL  agu  310  74.3487  21.1723  17.9204  100
n=a4pc  304  0.0014  0.0108  0  0.1517
infot4pc  286  6.0100Er05  0.0006  0  0.0095
deslevh  294  23.0698  7.2684  0 57.1429
sin luz  310  76.0124  25.4209 5.9936  100
aguanr  310  67.6176  23.3971  10.4521  100
alca  sin  310  76.2768  21.8418  14.6586  100
alca  ot  310  16.1283  16.3147  0 64.1026
aguadv  310  &9680  10.3644  0 56.4501
agua  fv  310  16.7037  13.7505  0 65.9341
agpaft  310  6.7107  7.1615  0 48.2235
tea4pe  304  2.8300E-05  8.34OOE-05  0  0.0007
37Annex  2.  The Demand  for Water Management  Services
We can understand  the results  for  water  management  better  by noting  that,  in terms  of
demand,  water  & sanitation  and  water  management  are different  from  other  sectors  in that
they  are  the aggregation  of two  public  services  - water  and  sewerage  - which  are  technically
and economically  distinct.  Indeed,  water  and  sewerage  are  additive,  sequenced  services
where  water  is generally  the higher  priority  and one  must  have  the first  before  having  access
to the second.  Improvements  to local  water  systems  will  tend  to follow  a progressive  pattern
as communities  become  wealthier  and  more  is invested  in this  sector,  resulting  in a service
escalation  roughly  as follows:
1.  No water,  no sanitation
2.  Public  standpipes,  no sanitation
3.  Public  standpipes,  open  sewers
4.  Private  standpipes,  open  sewers
5.  []...
6.  Internal  plumbing,  municipal  sewerage
This  pattern  holds  both  across  time,  and  cross-sectionally  across  a range  of
communities  differing  in wealth.  In reality  such  an escalation  occurs  not  in discrete  steps
but  more-or-less  continuously  in terms  of access  rates  of the population  to each  level  of
service.  The  point  is that  sequencing  occurs,  and  not  the  precise  path  that  the sequence
takes.
Our  analysis  of needs  variables  must  take  this  into  account,  and  accordingly  we posit
a demand  curve  for  this sector  which  looks  like  figure  A2  below.
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38If demand for water & sanitation  were linear in nature and progressive  in terms of needs
(i.e., existing  infrastructure),  it would look like the downward-sloping  line in the upper half
of the graph. Common  sense and our data suggest  that demand  will not vary uniformly over
different levels of service  provision,  however,  nor equally over each type of service. It
stands to reason that populations  with low levels of water and sanitation  will demand  more
new water infrastructure  than communities  where service levels are high. The lower curves
in figure A2 are implied  demand curves for water and sanitation  respectively,  assuming  that
investment  in this sector  goes first to water (public standpipes)  and only then to sewerage
(initially  rudimentary),  as water service  is simultaneously  improved. Hence  the origin of the
sanitation  axis is shifted  to the right of that of the water axis. The curve in boldface is the
vertical sum of the two independent  curves.
The negative  range at the left of the graph, where many people have no potable
water at all, can be interpreted  as a poverty  trap. Here a lack of water & sanitation
infrastructure  leads to ignorance  about  its benefits, and hence to low demand. As service
levels rise, however,  people witness its value to themselves  or their neighbors,  and demand
- and hence investment  - increases. At high levels of service  provision,  where water
infrastructure  is abundant,  investment  falls again. Our results support this interpretation.
Indeed  the graph above is constructed  from the results in figure 14, as well as additional
regressions  using variables for many levels  of infrastructure  stock.
39Annex 3. Sectors Where State Variables Are Not Significantly  Different
(i.e., rlm  = P2m).
Industry & Tourism
Figure  A3.1
Test  3: r2m-3pi. = QSm  +  liZim  - .**  +  fSZ5m +  Em
Model*
Independent  Variable  Il  c  o  il
Private  Sector  PC  a1  l  i  f  .00021 0.00029  9saE-tv
0.66  1.046  0.42
municipaities  1Tnce we canot  draw co0usosfo0hi0  eto.Ufo0naeywehv
0.418
infornalonTecholoy  PV  I  0(066
1.312
no  good,Comrhnsivet  iniaoofneoridsr  02  touis.  Th0a2al  e  a  s
-1  .562  -l1.583  -L158
* te nregreso  s  r portea wmic  roust  stan  dar  errors
o-stats  in parenthesesi  PCsVI  = Imst  pricipal  component  i  ane  iable
Our models in this sector are all isnsignificant.  We saw  anove  , indiating  are
investicantly  different  on average  (i.e.,  test  i  ), but indivfdually  different  only for 7
municipalities.  Hence we cannot  diraw  conc;lusions  for this sector. Unfortunately  we have
no good, compreheiisive indicator of neced  for industry & toun'isn.  The vaniable we can use
is the nurnber of theaters per capita - mimicipalities trying to develop their tourist potential
often invest in theatcrs, spoils staditinis and similar projects in the hopes of attracting
internal toun'sm (see Faguet 200()b). This variable is significant and positive, indicating that
investment  rose under decentralizationi  where such infrastructure  was in greatest  abundance.
No other variable is significant in our models, including surprisingly the number of private
sector firms, which we would expect to benefit most from such investment.  The evidence





Test 3:  S2m  im  =  +Sm  ±  . +  Tl5z 5 m  + -ll
Model*
Independent  Variable  I  II  III
Private  Sector PCVlI  -0.00083  0.00573  -0.00143
-G0.102  0.626  -0.25 5
0.437
Information  Technology  PCV1  0.023t)5
0.666
Prob>F  0.9281  0.9404  0.8689
OLS  regressions  reported  with  rob ust  standard  errors
t-stats  in parentheses;  PCV  1 =  1  st pricipal  componient  variable
Communication
Figure  A3.3
Test 3: 12Sm  Im  +  1Z  +  +  m  5 ZI  +  FmSSm
Mod el*
Independent  Variable  I  I  c  III
Privat  iSecorPv  a  t  -0.00044  -. 00054  -000049
-0.746  -1.1l32  -0.984
-0.474
Infomatln  Tehnolgy  PV  1  0.00013
0,109
_constant  -0.00014  -0.00183  -0.00251i
-0.034-0.417  -0.492
uiNregressions reportec  with robust  stnaders
t-stats  in parentheses;  PCV I = I st pricipal  component  variable
41All of our models in these sectors  are insignificant.  Additionally,  though  both
sectors pass test 1, they fail test 2 (above)  for a significant  difference  between state
variables. Hence we cannot draw  conclusions  from our results. As it happens  there are no
conclusions  to draw anyway,  as none of the variables  we use are significant. Our models




Test 3: P32mi13imP  =  ;Sm + ii1ZIm  +  *+  ±  15Zm  +  ±m
Model*
Independent  Variable  I  II  III
Private  Sector  PCVl  -0.00464 -0.00341 -0.00468
-1.283  -1.794  -2.311
CIVi  Institutons PCV1  0.  OIY
0.422
nomton  Tehnlgy  PC1  10.00863
1  ~~~~~1.466
0.895  1.01  0.016
regressions  reporte wit  ro ust standr  errors
t-stats  in parentheses;  PCV1  =  1st  pricipal  component  variable
Investment in energy did not change  significantly  before and after decentralization,
as we saw above,  and hence this model  is included here for the sake of completeness. Our
variable  of need, the share of population  without electricity,  is not significant  in any of our
models. Participative  planning  methodologies  are significant,  and negative,  suggesting  that
the use of such processes  led to a decrease  in post-decentralization  investment  in energy.
The private sector  is significant  and negative  in two models  and insignificant  in the third,
implying that this result is sensitive  to specification. Civil institutions,  IT and local training
activities are insignificant  in all the models. But in sum we make no claims about  energy
investment.
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